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The decline of budget revenue as share of national income which dropped from 31 per 
cent of GDP (1978) to 18 per cent (2002) (CSY 2003) describes the withdrawal of the 
Chinese state from the economy, and therefore suggests a step forward in the 
country’s transformation from a command to a market economy. Yet, economic 
transformation asks not only for less state appropriated of resources by the state, it 
also asks for a change of the means by which the state does so. Generally speaking, 
there are four ways to generate budgetary revenues: first, exploitation of state 
owned/controlled resources; second, taxation of assets and income or trade flows; 
third, forced loans on economic agents and finally, seigniorage. Given the 
commitment to price stability the Chinese reform policy forces the national 
government to rely on the first three revenue sources. Yet, privatisation, and shrinking 
profits of increasingly uncompetitive state firms translate into lower income from the 
state sector, while revenues from forced loans, i.e. compulsory transfers of the firms’ 
cash flow and compulsory saving of private households decline following price and 
wage liberalisation. Subsequently, state expenditure depends increasingly more on 
taxation, which needs to be revised to comply with the reform course. 
 
This shift in state revenue sources draws attention to the fact that transition economies 
need to establish market conforming taxation. Three aspects can be singled out. First, 
new tax codes need to include the re-emerging private sector, such as firms or 
investors, and foreign companies. Second, a new system of intergovernmental 
transfers needs to replace the old planning bureaucracy allowing for decentralisation. 
Third, a new tax bureaucracy needs to be established. In contrast to the European 
transition economies, which right from the beginning copied tax codes from 
neighbouring countries (or the EU), China opted for incremental reform of its tax 
system. In other words, economic transformation includes a thorough reform of the 
country’s public finances asking for a separate analysis. 
 
While the traditional public finance theory (see e.g. Musgrave 1959, 1969) 
propagating rational financial systems concentrate on the effectivity of taxation (and 
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spending) with respect to well-defined goals, the public choice literature treats the 
state as a Leviathan (see e.g. Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Mueller 1989) and sees 
fiscal federalism (see e.g. Oates 1972; Olson 1969) as institutional remedy. The trade 
off between rational taxation versus small government (expenditure) was taken up 
again in the discussion of institutional change in transition economies, where two 
opposing hypothesis define the conceptual and empirical discussion, namely the 
“Grabbing Hand”- hypothesis (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Treisman 1999) 
pointing to the risk that the Leviathan will survive economic transformation, and the 
“Helping Hand”- hypothesis (see e.g. Oi 1992; Walder 1995) stressing the benefit of 
continuing state intervention during the transformation period. The China specific 
dimension of this debate centres around three features, local autonomy, local diversity, 
and tax farming. 
 
Local autonomy 
 
The descriptive analysis of China’s fiscal reform since 1978 concludes that fiscal 
decentralisation whether intended or not, generated local autonomy. Some studies 
attribute China’s success to a market-preserving federalism that empowers local 
governments and offers them positive incentives for promoting local economic 
growth (see e.g. Montinola et al 1995; Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; 
Qian and Roland 1998). For example, local state corporatism (Oi 1992, 1994, 1995) 
describes the local government as a business corporation which mobilizes resources 
ad hoc, offers preferential tax policy, or brokers bank credit as means to insure 
profitability of its tax base. Such form of corporatism based on a loosely coupled 
coalitions (Nee 1992, 1998) between local government agencies and the emerging 
private sector leads to minimised up-ward tax transfers and facilitates the privatisation 
from below (Naughton 1994) when the industrial base of a locality can be added to 
the local tax base. 
 
In the case of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), local governments act as 
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quasi-owners when they claim residual profit and as quasi-tax-legislators when they 
levy taxes on TVEs provided these are registered as firms “outside the planned 
economy”. Subsequently, this institutional setting not only secures local property 
rights in a weak market setting and uncertain institutional environment (see e.g. 
Weitzman and Xu 1994; Chang and Wang 1994; Li 1996), but also gradually releases 
resources from state control accompanied by a shift of revenue sources from direct 
expropriation of profit or cash flow to taxation of firms in the non-state sector. 
 
Local diversity 
 
Characterised by a severe principal-agent problem between the central government as 
the principal and local units as agents, fiscal decentralization must also lead to local 
diversity (Krug 2004a; Krug and Hendrischke 2003; Hendrischke 2003). First, the 
central government grants different “degrees” of independent decision-making to 
different local government agencies (Bird and Chen 1998) as in the case of Special 
Economic Zones. Second, different local government agencies react differently to the 
same central policy guidelines according to different local conditions, such as size, 
geography, the historical legacy and different resource endowments (Krug 2004b; Hsu 
2004). Third, jurisdictional competition forces local governments to generate 
competitive advantages by offering preferential taxation and subsidies to its tax base 
(Walder 1995, 1996). Fourth, a co-operation between locally embedded firms and 
government agencies facilitates shirking of tax transfer obligations (Wedeman 2003; 
Shirk 1993; Wank 1996; Chen and Rozelle 1999; Goodman 2000)1. 
 
Tax farming 
 
A crucial means to offer positive incentives to local government agencies is tax 
farming as established in the eighties already. The tax farming system widely used in 
the pre-modern states of England and France is well analysed in economic history and 
transaction cost literature (see e.g. Kiser 1994; Kiser and Kane 2001; O’Brien 1988; 
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Donald and O’Brien 2002; Weir 1989; White 1995, 2004)2. It was only after the 
Glorious Revolution and French Revolution that a centralized tax bureaucracy was 
developed in response to changing transaction costs, i.e. enforcement costs, and the 
expansion of financial markets, which offered an alternative means for financing state 
budgets. An economic analysis of tax systems argues that two factors influence 
institutional choice: the monarch’s (state’s) attitude toward (economic or political) 
risk and the incentives necessary to prompt lower administrative units to act as tax 
agencies (at low costs). In general, three different forms of tax systems can be singled 
out, usually described as contractual arrangements between the central state and the 
local agents put in charge of tax implementation, a rent-based, a wage-based and a 
(crop-) sharing contractual arrangement (see e.g. Stiglitz 1974; Sappington 1991; 
Allen and Lueck 1995). The first refers to a lump sum contract-type where the central 
state “farms out” tax authority to local governments in return for a guaranteed (low 
risk) fixed sum. By doing so, local tax agents become the residual claimant on tax 
revenue. The second wage-based arrangement refers to a professional bureaucracy 
which in return for a share of the national budget, fixed wages and promotion within 
the state bureaucracy “selflessly” implements central policy without bearing 
individually or organisational risks. The third form follows cropshared contracs in 
which both central as lesser and local governments as lessee share economic risk 
productivity gains in tax administration (cropping sharing contract). 
 
Interestingly enough, China had a Weberian bureaucratic system in the socialist era. 
However, starting at 1978, the Chinese government introduced tax farming, to be 
followed (in the nineties) by a sharing system and the re-introduction of a 
bureaucratic system, a phenomenon that asks for an empirical analysis. Does that kind 
of institutional choice follows the arguments offered by the analytical concepts? More 
precisely, what are the factors that prompted institutional change from one system to 
the other? 
1. Normative considerations, such as taxing “equal activities equally”; 
2. Distributional considerations, most prominently the problem of regional 
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disparities; 
3. Economic considerations, such as standardization gains or transaction costs in 
monitoring and enforcement; 
4. Political considerations such as conflicting interests between the central and local 
government agencies, or setting incentives that ensure local government agencies 
to comply with the reform course. 
 
As will be shown in what follows the different reforms aimed mostly at a mixture of 
all these motives. However, at the end the economic and political considerations 
prevailed. 
 
A second set of questions refers to the present state of affairs: What is the effect of the 
tax reform in 1994? How did the local governments react? What is the status quo of 
the tax system at the local level at the lowest governmental level, the township? What 
can we say about the de facto as opposed to the de jure tax system? 
 
In order to analyse local autonomy caused by taxation, and to answer the questions 
above, it is necessary to explore not only the recent history. Such an analysis needs 
also to endogenise formal and informal elements in actual tax policy. For this reason 
findings from fieldwork undertaken in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province 2004 and 2005 
will be included in the part that deals with the actual functioning of the tax system at 
the township level. 
 
The remainder proceeds as follows. The next section (sec. 1 - 3) presents a descriptive 
analysis of the different reforms since 1978. Each section will stress the causes of and 
effects of institutional change with respect to local autonomy and local diversity. The 
status quo analysis of present tax system (sec. 4) serves as an introduction to the 
analysis of how the present tax system and local autonomy interact at the lowest layer 
of government in China (sec. 5) in order to illustrate the difference between the 
intended functioning of the tax system and the actual interplay between the taxation 
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and the emerging market sector. The paper ends with summarising the empirical 
results and an general assessment of China’ s tax system (sec. 6). 
 
1. Rebuilding tax codes: shifting government revenue 
 
In the pre-Reform era three categories of indirect taxes, the industrial and commercial 
i.e. tax, tariffs and custom duties, and the agriculture tax3 were levied in China4. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were subject to the industrial and commercial tax in 
addition to the compulsory transfer of “profit” and cash flow. Tax revenue (1978: 46 
per cent) and profit remittance (1978: 51 per cent) were the two dominant resources of 
total revenue (MOF 2005). To increase productive efficiency while avoiding 
privatisation the reforms introduced first a “contract responsibility system” (chengbao 
zeren zhi) to be followed by a “tax-for-profit” scheme (li gai shui) in 1983 and 1984. 
Both reforms acknowledged the SOEs as independent economic actors entitled to part 
of profit which they could allocate internally to working capital, investment, wages, 
and bonus without state intervention as long as they fulfilled the contract quota. The 
share of after tax profit and the tax rate were subject to individual negotiations 
between the firm and the bureaucracy in charge of the firm and varied according to 
enterprise size, sectors and ad hoc situation. It quickly turned out that in response to 
the fuzzy property rights the SOE managers channelled undisclosed profit into their 
private pocket by establishing joint ventures with TVEs or by outsourcing production 
to new private firms rather than reinvest in productivity increasing change (the 
Ratchet effect; Weitzman 1980). That asset-stripping eroded the state sector’s 
profitability further and ended in sharp increase of loss making SOEs. Yet, with a state 
sector still not liable to a hard budget constraint (Kornai 1986), the underperformance 
of the state sector directly translated into higher government expenditure in form of 
subsidies or loans necessary to “bail out” the bankrupt SOEs. The situation was 
further aggravated when the non-state sector started to out-compete the SOEs further 
reducing the latter’s profit remittance and tax contribution. In 1985 already, subsidies 
for SOEs were eleven times higher than the revenues from SOEs (MOF 2005). Facing 
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such eroding revenue base the central government had incentive enough to search for 
a new broader tax base, namely one that included foreign enterprises and all forms of 
joint ventures. 
 
Thus, direct (income) taxation made its re-appearance in China to which foreign 
enterprises, joint ventures, SOEs, collective enterprises and individuals became 
subject to. Simultaneously the reforms of indirect taxes started with introducing a 
VAT for twelve categories of products, such as machinery, steel, but also consumer 
goods, such as bicycles, electric fan, or sewing machines with rates between 6 per 
cent and 16 per cent. Other economic transaction were taxed by a product tax (270 
items) subject to a flat rate varying from 3 per cent to 60 per cent (and salt a tax) in 
1984. Such a diversified tax structure increased the monitoring and enforcement cost 
for tax collection and administration considerably. Unsurprisingly the 1994 reforms 
abolished the product tax, expanded VAT to all manufactured products with a standard 
rate of 17 per cent (and a reduced rate of 13 per cent for necessities), and levied a 
business tax on service industry but kept the consumption tax on 11 categories of 
goods.5 Since then in total twenty-nine taxes have been levied on turnover, income, 
resource, property and behaviour6. Since then indirect taxes are the major revenue 
source of the Chinese state. At present (2003) the VAT, consumption tax, business tax 
and custom duties add up to 69 per cent of total tax revenue, the VAT alone providing 
36 per cent of total revenue (SAT 2003). 
 
All in all, the reforms of 1994 support the assumption that tax changes can (and will) 
follow transaction costs considerations, i.e. monitoring, collecting and enforcement 
costs when indirect taxes were introduced. As was pointed out elsewhere indirect 
taxation allows concentrating on few taxable assets thereby offering lower collection 
costs than a system that aims at assets or income of all (potential) tax payers (Kiser 
and Kane 2001; Ardant 1975). China’s WTO entry in 2001 prompted further changes 
in order to comply with international standards. Foreign (15 per cent income tax) and 
domestic (25 per cent income tax) firms will no longer be treated differently by the 
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tax authorities (Mui and Jia 2002). The scope of VAT will be expanded to cover a 
broader range of products. A new social security and property tax are aim at better 
coping with economic transformation which includes employment insecurity and 
increase in wealth. 
 
All in all, the institutional change within the tax systems reflect the attempt to define a 
tax base and establish tax codes compatible with a market economy. The description 
also shows that transaction costs played a major role when it came to designing and 
re-designing the tax base, and tax rates. 
 
2. Tax farming: positive incentives and local autonomy 
 
Fiscal decentralisation in China refers to taxation and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, i.e. the allocation of revenue and expenditure across different government 
levels, based on a decentralisation of regulatory power or agreed upon transfers. The 
inherited centralised fiscal system relied on local government agencies to collect 
revenues for transfer to the national treasury. In return the central government 
assigned (expenditure) items financed basically by re-transferring revenues to local 
budgets. Labelled as “eating from the big pot (chi da guo fan)” local agencies had 
neither an incentive to promote the local economy, nor did they have the leeway to do 
so. 
 
To redress this problem, the reforms started with transferring fiscal authority, i.e. the 
power to tax, to local governments. Several experiments were carried out, such as 
“fixed overall revenue sharing rate” in Jiangsu province in 1977, “dividing central, 
local and central-local sharing revenue” in Sichuan province in 1979 and “fixed lump 
sum transfer” in Guangdong and Fujian province in 1979, later (1980-1993) expanded 
to six types of contract arrangements (see e.g. Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Wong 1991, 
1992). It is worth mentioning that these fiscal arrangements are modifications of tax 
contracting analytical models described earlier7. 
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Empirical fieldwork suggests that the rental-based model quickly emerged as the 
dominant form. In this kind of tax contracting the central government negotiates a 
fixed share of revenue (in absolute terms, or as a ratio) leaving the local government 
the de facto residual claimant of revenue. From the local perspective, local disposible 
revenues were directly linked to economic growth and/or the attractiveness of the 
local economy for investment from outside (other jurisdictions or foreign companies). 
Yet, as suggested in the economic analysis of tax farming, three unintended 
consequences emerged: First is the principal-agent problem remains unsolved. Local 
governments profit from asymmetric information; hiding the correct information if 
not falsifying tax reports is an easy way to minimise the amount of tax revenue to be 
transferred to the contract partner whether the national treasury or any superior 
government agency. Second, re-negotiable contracts include an element of uncertainty 
in local budget planning as well as in anticipating budgeting across localities. With the 
length of contracts and the sharing formulas re-negotiable, future budgetary revenue 
depends less on economic trends but rather on the relative power position of the 
contract partners. Contract arrangements vary also with respect to sharing rates, or 
time period, or spatial factors, when some provinces, regions, or localities are granted 
special licences from the central government. Third, as all “agents” share the interest 
to minimise upward transfers and manipulate the tax base, the state’s financial base 
eroded even further. Whether measured as total government revenue per GDP, or 
central revenue as share of total government revenue during the 1980-1993 period the 
trend is the same: The ratio of total government revenue to GDP fell from an already 
low 26 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 1993. The share of the central revenue to 
total government revenue fell from 41 per cent (1984) to 22 per cent (1993) (Figure 
1). 
 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
All in all, the introduction of tax farming reflects three considerations of the Chinese 
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government: First, to mobilise local support for the implementation of the reform 
course; second, to link the self-interest of local government agencies to the economic 
performance of their local jurisdictions and third to offer enough flexibility in the tax 
system that the widely differing local conditions can be taken care of. 
 
 
3. Tax sharing: bureaucratising tax administration 
 
In the face of shrinking revenue the central government attempted to re-centralise tax 
authority in the reforms of 1994 by building up a central tax bureaucracy regarded to 
more effectively implement tax collection. Yet, not much unlike the monarchs in 
Europe before them (Kiser and Kane 2001) the central government had to accept that 
local autonomy is not easily disposed of. The Tax Sharing System (fen shui zhi) (see 
e.g. Wong 1997; Wong et al 1995) aimed at replacing locally negotiated tax farming 
with a unified national system of taxation. Aside from the re-centralisation effort, the 
change was expected to address three further issues. An unified tax system would 
ensure equal taxation for equal transactions and tax base. A higher share of central 
revenue would ensure that distributional effects can be mitigated, as the system of 
local autonomy knew no provision (and no incentive) for inter-provincial transfers. (A 
third intention, namely the abolishment of extra- and off-budgetary revenue sources 
will be dealt with separately.) 
 
The newly introduced tax sharing system does not refer to a separation of tasks 
between different layers of government to which specific sources of revenues (taxes) 
are allocated as in “Western” models of multi-layered government, such as federalist 
states or the EU for example. Instead, the tax revenue (and not tax legislation) are 
divided in such a way that some taxes are exclusively assigned to the central level, 
some are assigned exclusively to the local level, and some taxes are shared between 
both levels according to a fixed ration. It is worth stressing that the category of local 
revenues includes fees and other kinds of revenue which are manipulated by local 
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governments. As table 1 illustrates these local taxes encompass a variety of fees and 
taxes, which reflect the willingness and ability to tap local resources when they 
concentrate on the taxation of relatively immobile factors rather than following an 
economic policy of generating competitive advantages for a locality8. At first sight the 
tax sharing system seems to follow international practice in the sense that the two 
largest revenue sources, namely the VAT and income tax, are divided between the 
central and local level (see table 2). That revenues from tariffs go directly to the 
national coffer is also common standard. On the other hand the socialist legacy can be 
seen in the fact that the income taxation of foreign firms remains a concern of the 
central government. 
 
[insert table 2 about here] 
 
To better cope with the monitoring and enforcement problem the tax administration  
was split into two separate bureaucracies each of which with a distinctive line of 
command. The national tax bureau (guoshuiju, NTBs) subordinate to the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT), which in turn is defined as a ministry (since 1993), 
was put in charge of central and shared taxes9. While the SAT is autonomous with 
respect to central taxes, its role changes when it comes to local taxes administered by 
local tax bureaus (dishuiju, LTBs), the second tax bureaucracy. As stipulated by the 
law, the SAT and local government “jointly” supervise the LTBs, which in the case of 
the SAT limits its role to operational guidance (yewu zhidao) and comment on 
nominations for tax personnel to the provincial LTBs (Figure 2). In other words, LTBs 
in particular below the provincial level are de facto subordinated to local governments 
leaving the institutional architecture of local autonomy as it were. 
 
Unintended, the tax reforms established a dual tax system where a streamlined 
Weberian bureaucracy for central taxation (including those taxes whose revenue were 
to be shared with local units) and largely unreformed local tax farming co-exist. A 
closer look at the reforms indicates that the reason for such top down 
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bureaucratisation is to be found in the shortage of professional tax personnel able to 
run a modern centralised tax administration, and the lack of modern monitoring 
devices that would keep the costs of tax collection (and moral hazard)10 low. 
 
[insert figure 2 about here] 
 
Aside from the introduction of computer based monitoring devices, a system of 
merit-based recruitment and systematic training (0.4 million national and 0.35 million 
local tax officials in 2002 alone) is seen as the first necessary step for shifting toward 
a bureaucratic tax system at all levels of government. At the same time the personnel 
deployment policy which asks for out of place-of-origin appointments and job 
rotation is seen as a means to prevent corruption following stricter legislation as 
stipulated in the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (1995) and the 
amendment to the Criminal Law which explicitly addresses the problem of tax 
collection and dereliction of duty on taxation (1997). 
 
While the initial purpose to increase the financial means in control of the central state 
was achieved 11  the more detailed analysis shows that the system was rather 
ineffective with respect to establishing as rational unified tax codes and tax 
bureaucracy. Tax farming is still the dominant institutional architecture at the lower 
level of the state political and administrative system. Once more transaction cost 
considerations – and the need to compromise politically with local politicians and 
agencies, prevail in institutional choice. 
 
 
4. The status quo of the tax system 
 
It is worth emphasizing that all reforms in the last three decades were directed toward 
the provincial level, while sub-provincial government agencies were rarely mentioned. 
General recommendations, such as to “promote” local initiatives (fangquan rangli) or 
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to “adjust” for local conditions (yindi zhiyi) left the provinces with considerable 
leeway to modify central policy. Thus, for example the 1994 reform merely stipulates 
that provinces improve sub-provincial fiscal administration without giving further 
directions. This neglect needs to be interpreted as the political compromise in which 
in particular rich provinces or sub-provincial government agencies saw their 
discretionary power re-confirmed in return of compliance with other parts of the 
reform programme, as for example the building up of a national tax bureaucracy 
outside the reach of “local” control. 
 
Ad hoc non-tax levies 
 
One of the most striking difference between the Chinese and international tax systems 
are the so-called extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) and off-budgetary revenues 
(OBRs), two devices inherited from the socialist past yet in the nineties re-invented 
for ad hoc taxation, and for legitimising the income from commercial activities (see 
e.g. Wong 1997, 1998; Fan 1998; Eckaus 2003). 
 
Extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) originated in 1950 as a means to search for more 
financial means for local specially earmarked expenditure. It includes three major 
parts: 1) government funds and surtaxes, such as agriculture surtax, and education 
surtax, levied on the income, consumption, profit or turnover base; 2) a hold up of 
special funds of SOEs, such as depreciation, major repair, and innovation funds; and 3) 
locally self-raised funds and administrative fees, such as road construction fund, 
public utility fee, road toll, and tuition fee12. OBRs on the other hand are public 
“voluntary” contributions made by individuals, firms or Overseas Chinese, various 
unregulated fees, and lately, profits from TVEs, and revenues from land sales (Fan 
1998). Lacking uniform procedures with respect to computation, base, rate, or 
frequency means that in fact, EBRs (or OBRs) are quasi-taxes. Their ambiguous legal 
status adds support to the notion of strong local autonomy in today’s fiscal system 
(Wong 1998). 
 Page 15 12/16/2005 
  15
 
EBRs and OBRs were hardly worth mentioning if they had not been hijacked by local 
governments in the nineties for legitimising new revenue sources. As said before local 
governments have no tax legislation power and are only entitled to collect “local tax” 
legislated by the national government whose total amount cannot but add to a minor 
faction of local budgets (Table 3). Yet, driven by local self-interests and disposable 
revenues maximization, local governments are motivated to search for additional 
revenues sources whether entitled to do so or not. They sell state assets, invest in 
business activities, apportion mandatory contributions to local projects, issue local 
bonds, or levy (il-)legal service charges, the proceeds of which are listed as EBRs and 
OBRs in order to suggest legitimate revenue sources. As will be shown later (Figure 4 
and 5) the revenues from commercial activities for which there is no precedent in the 
socialist era became the largest source for local income in particular in the rich East. 
Profit or local taxes on TVEs (or dividends) as well as proceeds from land deals and 
real estate management can make local government agencies independent from 
central budgetary control. EBRs and OBRs are used to legitimise revenue 
maximisation, a further evidence for the resistance of local levels to give up local 
autonomy. 
 
 
[insert table 3 about here] 
 
EBRs and OBRs remain a controversial issue in analytical studies. Some studies 
stress the negative influence on economic stabilization, state redistribution capacity 
and fiscal administration (see e.g. Wong 1998; Lee 2000), while others emphasize its 
positive outcome in form of local wealth as measured in the provision of local public 
goods and services, such as school or heath care (see e.g. Fan 1998). In some places, 
such as the less-developed inland regions, arbitrary EBR- or OBR-extraction led to 
rural protest and violence (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Tsui and Wang 2004). On the other 
hand, in costal and developed provinces, the advantages of EBRs or OBRs is seen in 
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the ability of local government agencies to quickly respond to local public needs, if 
not as a starting point for more civil participation in local policy formation (shown in 
Fan’s (1998) field research). 
 
 
Complicated intergovernmental transfer system 
 
There is still no procedure how to co-ordinate intergovernmental transfers between 
the five layers of the administrative hierarchy: central, provincial, prefecture, county 
and township. The present tax sharing system only deals with the central-provincial 
level and leaves considerable discretionary power for sub-provincial transfer practices. 
Diversity within the sub-provincial intergovernmental transfer system is unavoidable. 
The 1994 reforms did not tackle the problem, to the contrary it became even more 
complicated by adding the new transfer modes of national taxation. 
 
Under the previous tax farming system, local governments transfer the contracted 
lump-sum amount, a progressive sharing ratio on incremental revenue, or a fixed 
sharing ratio of overall revenues (or combination of all these). In return the central 
government re-transfer subsidies to the province according to the agreed upon fixed 
amount, earmarked purposes or ad hoc appropriation of local budget surpluses 
(jiesuan) at the end of fiscal year. Aside from the former negotiable transfer system, 
the present reforms introduced the rule-based transfer for the national taxes 
supervised by the SAT. For instance, local governments are entitled to the re-transfer 
of 25, 40 and 40 per cent of the VAT, corporate and individual income tax 
respectively. 
 
In other words, the tax farming nature of sub-provincial intergovernmental relations is 
kept unchanged. Superior layers of government farm out taxation to lower layers. 
Such a tax contract describes the agreed upon share of tax revenue to be transferred to 
the superior level as well as the agreed upon provision of public services invested and 
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operated by the lower level. Negotiations between different levels of local 
governments on transfer and re-transfer of revenue became a constant feature of local 
intergovernmental relations. Regardless which version of tax contracting is chosen, 
two systematic features dominate the effects: First, as a “lessee” and residual claimant, 
each agency at the lower level attempting to maximize discretionary revenue will shift 
expenditure for public services upwards while manipulating the tax base to minimise 
upward transfers (Tsui and Wang 2004). Second, as will be seen presently, effective 
tax rates do not reflect tax legislation; they are rather the outcome of 
intergovernmental tax contracting, and the unsolved principal agent problem, or 
reflect the innovativeness of sub-provincial government agencies in finding new 
revenue generating resources. 
 
Dual tax administration system 
 
As said earlier, two tax systems co-exist in China. One is defined by national 
legislation which stipulates the tax base, tax rates, the procedure by which taxes are 
enforced, and how total revenue is shared between the central and local budgets 
(consolidated at the provincial level). The other one is characterized by provincial and 
sub-provincial discretion and tax contracting, ad hoc taxation, and unspecified 
procedures. This dual tax system has major implications: First, firms can calculate the 
effective tax rate only ex post when the exact local rates and fees are known. This 
makes, second, the local government agencies the ultimate authority in defining 
effective tax rates. Third, local government agencies facing different (financial) needs 
and/or different political leverage in tax contracting will differ in their revenue 
generating policy, subsequently contributing to the diversity in the local business 
environment. Finally, the national treasury or central government has only limited 
ways of controlling overall taxation. The most recent reform focused only on the 
revenue and central-provincial sharing side and cut off the link to the government 
spending. Moreover, the “tax-for-fee” reform launched since 2000 attempting to put 
an end to the practices of sub-provincial government agencies using ad hoc fees (Yep 
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2004) aimed at closer budgetary control, yet also on limiting the overall tax burden 
for overcharged peasant households, i.e. distributional purposes. The effect was 
minimal if not counterproductive as it forced local governments to generate even 
more revenue sources by embarking on commercial activities. 
 
 
5. M and L Township: Budgets and intergovernmental transfer 
 
Taxation in China is undoubtedly a bizarre institutional arrangement where different 
tax jurisdictions overlap and procedures are left unspecified, or burdened with a 
political rhetoric that confuses even the technical side of tax collection. How does this 
system work in practice? With only few information available at the local, i.e. 
prefectural, county and township, level, data need to be generated before a systematic 
analysis can be attempted. The authors decided to focus on the lowest level of the 
political and administrative hierarchy, namely the township, as this is the government 
agent, which meets the tax payer (in most cases firms)13. On the factual side we 
wanted to know how the dual tax system affects local budgets, and how 
intergovernmental transfer contributed to local revenues. At the behavioural side, we 
wanted to know how the effective tax rate for firms is calculated, how much 
disposible income townships have and how they make use of their disposible funds. 
Finally, we expected that the answers to this question would shed more insights on the 
problem of diversity and local autonomy. The interviews conducted between 2003 and 
2005 cannot answer all these questions. Instead of offering general interpretations 
based on weak evidence (and much guessing), we decided to present two case studies 
which to the best of our knowledge offer the first complete picture of budgets and 
budgetary procedures in two townships, called M and L. 
 
Revenues 
 
The budgets of the two townships presented in Table 4 and Table 5, offer different 
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pictures which is partly caused by different ways to categorise revenue items. 
Township M classifies all revenue into two categories only, namely budgetary revenue 
and extra-budgetary revenue, while Township L is much more specific. In the latter 
case revenues as listed as budgetary revenue, budgetary fund revenue, earmarked fund 
revenue and “other revenue” (Table 4). This practice confirms the findings from the 
World Bank (2002, p. 64) that there is no standard procedure for reporting revenues at 
the local level. 
 
[insert table 4 about here] 
 
After reclassifying the revenue item (in Table 5), a direct comparison reads as follows:  
Township M depends much more on taxation (45.2% of total financial revenue) and 
extra-budgetary revenues (22.3%) than Township L (24.4% and 11.6%, respectively). 
To put it differently “other revenue” the category were revenue from commercial 
activities are listed, contributes 32.5% in Township M, yet 64% in Township L 
suggesting that the latter is more involved in land deals, TVE shareholding and other 
business activities. It is worth emphasizing the returns from TVEs (dividends or profit) 
contribute 9.9% of total revenue compared to the proceeds from land sales plus local 
tax on transaction, which add up to 53.6% of total revenue! 
 
[insert table 5 about here] 
 
Intergovernmental transfer 
 
Information about intergovernmental transfer of taxes is not published but needs to be 
generated by interviewing three to four groups of economic agents: representatives of 
the national and local tax administration, representatives of the local government, and 
firms. Instead the transfers follow the bargaining between government agencies, and 
between the township and firms. The interviews in Township M suggest three features 
that characterise transfer practice at the township level. 
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1) The Township M has to share revenue with four superior government layers of 
district (county level), prefecture, province and central. Interaction between these 
different layers of government agencies is partly statutory, i.e. based on legislation, 
and partly resulting from previous negotiations. At the time of the interview seven 
transfer modes were employed. Aside from the standardised sharing rules supervised 
by the SAT, a negotiated sharing of “excess” tax income, as for example more revenue 
from VAT than anticipated in the tax contracts for a budget year (see below). Other 
sharing formulas address “approved budgetary expenditure”, “approved budgetary 
expenditure of financial department”, “other shared tax items”, “subsidy from 
superior units” and “remittance to the prefecture level”. Each mode follows distinctive 
formulas such as quota-based, growth-based, progressive or regressive rates. For 
instance, in the tax contract for 2003 M Township agreed to collect 120 million RMB 
in VAT and consumption tax on behalf of the SAT. The actually collected amount 
added up to 160 million, which was not allocated according to the usual 75:25 
percentage formula between the centre and the local units. Instead the M Township is 
entitled to a bonus based on the 40 million of “excess” revenue. The calculations 
follows a ‘progressive’ rate: 12% bonus for the first 12% of the excess revenue (1.73 
million), 15% bonus for the following 12-15% of excess revenue (54 thousand) and 
18% bonus for any excess beyond 15% (3.94 million). The total amount of the thus 
calculated bonus added up to 6.2 million considerably lower than the 10 milllion the 
local tax agencies would have been entitled to, if the usual tax sharing formula had 
been applied (Table 6). 
 
[insert table 6 about here] 
 
2) Superior government agencies, such as the province, prefecture or county can and 
will press for a sharing formula which squeezes the township of the tax income 
generated at the township level. All what is needed is a document called hongtou 
wenjian. This form of state capture (Hellman 1998) can be illustrated by the way the 
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bonus on VAT collection got allocated to different layers of government. For instance, 
Township M bonus whose calculation was described above was entitled to a share of 
3.88% of total revenue of VAT and consumption tax generated in the township. Yet, 
Suzhou city superior to M township appropriated 0.6% of the total revenue, leaving M 
township with 3.28%. Even worse, for 2004 Suzhou plans to increase “its” share to 
1.6%, which would cut Township M’s share to 2.06% (Table 6). 
 
3) The general picture for Jiangsu province looks as follows. Out of the 25% which 
according to national legislation go to local units in case of the VAT and consumption 
tax, 50 per cent are claimed by the provincial government, 16 per cent are claimed at 
the prefectural level, 6.8 percent remain at the county level, and only 27.2 per cent 
remain in the township.  Likewise, the actual division of total tax revenue collected 
by Township M in 2003 will be split as follows 40 per cent central budget, 27 per cent 
provincial budget, 10 per cent prefectural budget, 5 per cent district (county) budget 
and 18 per cent township budget.  Unsurprisingly the local government officials in 
officials in Township M “lament that they are sacrificed for superior officials” . They 
as obviously most other townships search for alternative revenue sources via 
commercial activities, which after all are off-budgetary activities. 
 
Expenditures 
 
Only after looking at the revenue and expenditure side, can the complete picture of 
financial flows around the local tax system be seen. One major reason why the 
expenditure side needs to be integrated into the analysis of intergovernmental transfer 
and local budgets is the fact, that tax farming between the township and the tax payer 
shows up at the expenditure side. As said before the township cannot change or 
modify tax legislation, while at the same time having a strong incentive to cultivate a 
wealthy tax base, if not to expand the tax base by attracting additional investment. 
Thus, the tax contracts between the township and individual firms do not prescribe 
lower tax rates for example. Instead tax rebates or exemption, bonus, grants, subsidy, 
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or awards are negotiated which promise ex post reimbursement for taxes paid. These 
rebates are usually listed as means for supporting the locals economic sector. 
 
[insert figure 4 about here] 
 
Thus for example, L Township grants all firms established since 2001 a three-year 
exemption (via ex post reimbursements from local budget) from VAT, enterprise 
income tax and business tax. Likewise, firms investing more than 10 million RMB in 
technological innovation enjoy a three-years tax refund. These refunds show up in the 
expenditure side of the Township L (Table 7) under industry and transportation item in 
2003, reaching 38 million RMB at 20.9% of Township L’s total financial expenditure. 
In addition to tax preferential treatment, Township L invested in 46 million RMB 
(25.6% of total expenditure) in infrastructure and 65 million RMB (35.9% of total 
expenditure) in education to improve investment environment. Another means for 
jurisdictional competition are land prices, which at a discounted rate can be used for 
attracting investment. As township L claims it was this policy, which enabled them to 
attract 83 new established enterprises in 2003, out of which forty enterprises were 
from other localities. 
 
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
To sum up, tax faming at the lowest administrative level defines the effective tax rate 
for firms, i.e. by far the largest taxpayer. The effective tax rate can be calculated only 
ex post, as the rate depends on reimbursement in the following year. Jurisdictional 
competition between lower level government agencies exists and thrives; yet 
alimented by local returns from commercial activities of government agencies rather 
than by “tax design”. Intergovernmental transfer is renegotiable and a way how in 
particular the middle-layers of government, such as prefecture and county can 
appropriate a share on tax revenue. At township level tax administration and tax 
policy cannot be separated. Despite all the technical formulae used within the tax 
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sharing process, the budget procedure at the township level follows three rather 
straightforward steps. The township first estimates the total amount needed for 
fulfilling the mandatory tasks, keeping the agreed upon commitments to different 
groups, such as firms and the money needed for running local government.  In a 
second step, the township negotiates with all other local government agencies the 
volume of tax revenue to be transferred and re-transferred. As the township knows 
from past experience the range of transfers and re-transfers it can kind of anticipate a 
deficit or surplus. The township will simultaneously, in a third step, search for 
additional revenue sources outside the bureaucratic tax system. In short, the township 
is not forced to adjust expenditure to revenue available, but adjusts revenue to 
expenditure planned and contracted. The system implies further that the more the 
central state attempts to harden the budget constraint the more will townships turn 
entrepreneurial, by embarking on business activities outside the reach of bureaucratic 
control. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
China’s tax system is unique. We don’t know of any other case where a national tax 
bureaucracy and local tax farming co-exist. It would however be misleading to 
interpret this co-existence as a case where the socialist legacy prevails. To the contrary, 
the institutional change in taxation is the deliberate response to the political and 
economic development in China’s economic transformation. 
 
First, aside from the rhetoric, the reforms were driven by transaction cost 
considerations and political compromises. Each reform step reveals the search for a 
broader tax base, and enforcement mechanism, which increase the administrative 
efficiency. Second, the tax system and its changes serve as a means to better align the 
interests between the different layers of government agencies. Unlike other countries 
where taxation defines hard (budget) constraints and state enforcement agencies, 
China’s tax system offers positive incentives for its tax agents which in return for 
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compliance to the national tax codes, if not the whole reform programme, are entitled 
to residual tax revenue. Third, tax farming harnesses local autonomy. It offers 
townships a resource base outside central control. It is worth stressing that local 
autonomy in China is not the consequence of a constitutional separation of power, but 
the consequence decentralisation, i.e. the transfer of regulatory power to local 
agencies, and the transfer of resources that enable local jurisdictions, such as the 
township to finance local policy. Fourth, unsurprisingly then, tax farming must 
contribute to diversity in economic outcomes as well as diversity in the institutional 
architecture at the local level. It is hard to find evidence which would support the 
Grabbing Hand -or state seizure-hypothesis (Northrup and Rowan 1963; Fry 2002) on 
the one hand and the Helping Hand- or state capture hypothesis (Hellman 1998) on 
the other hand which claim that over time the central state will increasingly 
appropriate more resources in the case of the former; or that the alliance between the 
business community and local government agencies will over time subvert the 
institutional architecture to better serve their own self-interest. Both would imply the 
emergence of informal if not illegal organisations and institutions, while the tax 
farming bargaining game is part of the official tax system. From this point of view the 
local tax farming can be seen as an ex ante device for limiting, if not even legitimising, 
ex post opportunism (of the tax agents). Finally, jurisdictional competition seems to 
work, limiting overall taxation. This does not mean however that China can expect a 
corporatist state with as many local business and tax systems as townships or counties. 
As the interviews indicate, imitation of good (tax) practices in neighbouring localities 
will lead to a at least regional convergence of the de facto tax systems, if not tax 
practices. 
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Table 1: China’s Tax Codes after 1994 
 
 Taxes 
National tax Consumption tax, Tariff, Income tax on FIEs and FEs a, Vehicle acquisition tax 
Local tax 
Business tax b, Agricultural tax, Tax on special agricultural produce, Animal 
husbandry tax, Resource tax c, Urban and township land usage tax, Occupied 
farmland tax, Real estate tax d, Urban real estate tax d, Land appreciation tax, 
Urban maintenance and construction tax e, Deed tax, Vehicle and vessel usage 
license tax, Vehicle and vessel usage tax, Vessel tonnage tax, Slaughter tax f, 
Banquet tax f, Orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset g 
Shared tax 
Value-added tax (VAT), Enterprise income tax h, Individual income tax, Stamp 
tax 
 
Notes: 
a. Enterprises with foreign investment (FIEs) include Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, 
Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises; Foreign enterprises 
(FEs) include foreign companies, and other economic organizations that are not Chinese legal entities, 
but operate in China. The nominal income tax rate on FIEs and FEs is 33% of which 30% are allocated 
to the central, and 3% to the local government. 
b. Business taxes on railway, headquarters of banks or insurance companies go to the central government.  
c. The resource tax on ocean and petrol companies go to the central government.  
d. Domestic enterprises and Chinese citizens are subject to the real estate tax while FEs, FIEs and 
foreigners are subject to the urban real estate tax.  
e. Urban maintenance and construction tax of the Railway Administration, the headquarters of banks and 
insurance companies go to the central government.  
f. According to State Council circular (Guofa[1994]No.7) local government are expected to abolish the 
slaughter tax and banquet tax. 
g. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly issued a circular (Caishuifa[1999] No.299) to suspend 
levying the orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset. 
h. Income tax of the enterprises subordinate to the central government, local banks, foreign-funded banks 
and non-bank financial institutions are allocated to the central government. 
Source: 
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Table 2: Central-local Taxes: Sharing Formula  
Shared Taxes Central Local 
VAT 75% 25% 
Enterprises income tax a 
50%(2002) 
60%(2003) 
50%(2002) 
40%(2003) 
Individual income tax b 
50%(2002) 
60%(2003) 
50%(2002) 
40%(2003) 
Stamp tax 
94% of taxes on security 
transaction 
6% of taxes on security 
transaction 
Other stamp taxes 
Notes: 
a. Before 2002 the “corporate income tax” on domestic enterprises was a local tax, since then it is a 
shared tax.  
b. Taxes on capital gains go to the central government. Before 2002 the personal income tax was a local 
tax, afterwards it became a shared tax after. 
Source: 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003) 
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Table 3: Tax Collections by Authorities 
Collection Authority Items 
National tax bureaus 
(NTBs) 
Consumption tax, VAT, income tax on enterprises a, Income tax on FIEs 
and FEs, stamp tax on security transaction, vehicle acquisition tax 
Local tax bureaus 
(LTBs) 
Business tax, individual income tax b, resource tax, urban and township 
land usage tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, real estate tax, 
urban real estate tax, land appreciation tax, vehicle and vessel usage 
license tax, vehicle and vessel usage tax, slaughter tax, banquet tax, 
other stamp taxes 
Customs 
Tariff, VAT (collected by Customs), consumption tax (collected by the 
Customs), vessel tonnage tax 
MOF/LTBs c 
Agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce, animal husbandry 
tax, deed tax, and occupied farmland tax 
Notes: 
a. The local tax bureau collects corporate income tax of those domestic firms established before 1 January 
2002. The SAT collects the same tax of younger firms. Corporate income tax on central government 
owned enterprises, ministry of railway, headquarters of banks, ocean and petrol companies are also 
collected by the SAT. 
b. Individual income tax became shared tax in 2002 but it is still collected by the local tax bureau. 
c. Before 1996, Ministry of Finance (MOF) collected occupied farmland tax, deed tax, agricultural tax, 
tax on special agricultural produce and the animal husbandry tax, to be replaced bay local tax bureaus.  
Sources: 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003); State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Table 4: The revenue side of M and L Townships’ Budgets 
M Township Original tax base  L Township Original tax base 
Budgetary revenue Income, output  Budgetary revenue Income, output 
Bonus remittance of taxes   Bonus remittance of taxes  
Fixed remittance of taxes   Fixed remittance of taxes  
Earmarked subsidy   Earmarked subsidy  
Extra-budgetary revenue   Budgetary fund revenue  
Surcharges to taxes for
education 
Income, output  Surcharges to taxes for rural 
education 
Income, output 
Fee for garbage collection user  Surcharges to taxes for 
education 
Income, output 
Fee for sewage disposal user  Earmarked fund revenue  
Fee for public security p.c., per firm  Profit of TVEs  
Fee for public utility user  Fee from administration 
agencies 
User, p.c. 
Water rates user  Water conservancy 
construction fund 
p.c., per firm 
Fee for family planning p.c.  Proceeds of 
education-assets-sale 
Banking interests   Other subsidy  
Other subsidy   Other revenue  
Proceeds of land-sale   Proceeds of land-sale  
Fee for land transaction   Fee for land transaction  
Other   Other  
Note: User charges asked by those units that provides the service, i.e. usually public utilities, are not 
fees in budgetary terms but charged by the providers directly (Eckaus 2003, 78) 
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 (2004) 
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Table 5: Composition Revenue, 2003: M and L Township 
Items M (%) L (%) 
Total financial revenue 100 100 
Budgetary revenue 45.23 24.40 
thereof   
Bonus remittance of taxes 31.90 18.20 
Fixed remittance of taxes 12.78 4.58 
Earmarked subsidy 
 
0.55 1.62 
Extra-budgetary revenue 22.28 11.65 
thereof   
Surcharges to taxes for education 4.08 5.44 
Fees charged by administration agencies 6.51 1.63 
Other 
 
11.69 4.58 
Other revenue 32.49 63.95 
thereof   
Proceeds of land-sale 26.99 44.58 
Fees for land transaction 5.24 8.98 
Profit of TVEs or governmental investments 0.03 9.85 
Other 0.69 0.54 
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 (2004) 
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Table 6: A case of state capture: Sharing VAT and Consumption Tax Revenue M 
township, (2003 -2004 in mil. RMB) 
No. Item 2003 2004 Remarks 
1 VAT and consumption tax 160 210 a Total tax revenue collected. 
2 Revenue target 120 160 Total tax revenue collected in last year.
3 
Growth part above revenue 
target 
39 49 3=1-2 
4 
Share based on 0-12% part of 
growth part 
1.73 2.31 Shared ratio 12%; 4=2*12%*12% 
5 
Share based on 12-15% part of 
growth part 
0.54 0.72 
Shared ratio 15%; 
5=2*(15%-12%)*15% 
6 
Share based on above 15% 
part of growth part 
3.94 4.66 Shared ratio 18%; 6=(3-2*15%)*18% 
7 Township entitlement to share 6.21 7.69 7=4+5+6 
8 Remittance to prefecture level 0.96 3.36 
8=1*remittance ratio; (0.6% 2003, 
1.6% 2004) 
9 Actual shred revenue 5.25 4.33 9=7-8 
10 Actual shared percentage (%) 3.28% 2.06% 10=9/1 
Note: 
a. predicted figure based on revenue task 2004. 
Source: 
Respondent 24 (2004) 
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Table 7: The Expenditure Side of L Township’ Budget, 2003 
Items Amount (million RMB) Per cent 
Total financial expenditure 181 100 
Agriculture 4 2.5 
Industry and transportation 38 20.9 
Infrastructure 46 25.6 
Education 65 35.9 
Culture 8 4.5 
Health 3 1.9 
Social 4 2.4 
Administration 10 5.4 
Other 2 0.9 
Source: Respondent 26 (2004) 
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Figure 1: Ratio of government revenue to GDP and central to total government 
revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
a. The government revenue refers to budgetary revenue. 
b. Domestic and foreign debts are excludes. 
Source: 
State Administration of Taxation, PRC,  China Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 
2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ratio of government revenue to GDP (%) Ratio of central to total government revenue (%)
 Page 33 12/16/2005 
  33
 
Figure 2: Structure of Taxation Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
c. The hierarchy of taxation administration is corresponding to government administrative structure. 
d. The black line refers to vertical leadership. 
e. The dashed line refers to operational guidance. 
Source: 
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Figure 3 Financial Revenue and Expenditure at Township Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
a. Shadow part of expenditure refers to extra expenditure of actual amount. 
 
 
 
Financial revenue pool 
 
Budgetary revenue 
 
Taxes 
Extra-budgetary 
revenue 
Funds/surcharges/fees 
Off-budgetary revenue 
Proceeds of land sale 
Financial expenditure package 
 
 
Budgetary 
expenditure 
 
Extra-budgetary 
expenditure 
 Soft constrain 
Hard constrain 
Upper jurisdiction 
 
 
Public 
expenditure 
Supporting local economic sector 
Tax refund/subsidy 
 Page 35 12/16/2005 
  35
Reference 
Allen, D.W. and Lueck, D. 1995. Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts. 
American Economic Review 85:447-451. 
Ardant, G. 1975. Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and 
Nations. In Tilly, C. (ed.) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bernstein, T.P. and Lü, X. 2003. Taxation without Representation in Contemporary 
Rural China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bird, R.M. and Chen, D. 1998. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China in 
International Perspective. In Brean, D.J.S. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New 
York: Routledge Press. 
Brean, D.J.S. 1998. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New York: Routledge Press. 
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a 
Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, J. 1996. An Institutional Analysis of Fiscal Reform in Postcommunist 
Europe. Theory and Society 25:45-84. 
Chang, C. and Wang, Y. 1994. The Nature of The Township-Village Enterprises. 
Journal of Comparative Economics 19:434-52. 
Chen, H. and Rozelle, S. 1999. Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of Township 
and Village Enterprises in China. Journal of Development Economics 60: 529-557. 
China Statistical Yearbook. 2003. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
Chung, J. H. 1995. Studies of Central-provincial Relations in People’s Republic of 
China: A Mid-term Appraisal, China Quarterly 142: 487-580. 
Donald, W. and O’Brien, P. K. 2002. (ed.) The Political Economy of British Historical 
Experience, 1688-1914. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Eckaus, R. 2003. Some Consequences of fiscal reliance on extrabudgetary revenues in 
China. China Economic Review 14:72-88. 
Fan, G. 1998. Market-oriented economic reform and the growth of off-budget local 
public finance. In Brean, D. J. S. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New York: 
 Page 36 12/16/2005 
  36
Routledge Press. 
Frye, T. 2002. Capture or Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia. European Asia 
Studies (forthcoming) 
Frye, T. and Shleifer, A. 1997. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand. American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87:354-358. 
Goodman, D.S.G. 2000. The Localism of Local Leadership: Cadres in Reform Shanxi. 
Journal of Contemporary China 9: 159-183. 
Grandy, C. 1989. New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929. Journal of 
Economic History 49:677-92. 
Hellman, J.S. 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in 
Postcommunist Nations. World Politics 50:203-234. 
Henderischke, H. 2003. How local are local enterprises? Privatisation and 
translocality of small firms in Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Provincial China 7:27-39. 
Hsu, S. P. 2004. Deconstructing Decentralization in China: fiscal incentive versus 
local autonomy in policy implementation. Journal of Contemporary China 13: 
567-599. 
Kiser, E. 1994. Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal 
Agent Analysis. Politics and Society 22:284-315. 
Kiser, E. and Kane, J. 2001. Revolution and State Structure: The Bureaucratisation of 
Tax Administration on Early Modern England and France. American Journal of 
Sociology. 107:183-223. 
Kiser, E. and Tong, X. 1992. Determinants of the Amount and Type of Corruption in 
State Fiscal Bureaucracies: An Analysis of Late Imperial China. Comparative 
Political Studies 25:300-331. 
Kornai, J. 1986. The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos 39: 3–30. 
Krug, B. 2004a. (ed.) China’s Rational Entrepreneurs. The development of the new 
private business sector. London: Routledge Press. 
Krug, B. 2004b. Introduction: New Opportunities, New Sector, New Firms. in Krug, 
B. (ed.) China’s Rational Entrepreneurs: The Development of the New Private 
Business Sector. London: Routledge Press. 
 Page 37 12/16/2005 
  37
Krug, B. and Hendrischke, H. 2003. China Incorporated: Property Rights, 
Privatisation, and the Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China. Managerial 
Finance 29.12: 32-45. 
Lee, P.K. 2000. Into the Trap of Strengthening State Capacity: China’s 
Tax-Assignment Reform. China Quarterly 164:1007-1025. 
Li, D.D. 1996. Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the 
Chinese Non-State Sector. Journal of Comparative Economics 23:1-19. 
Ma, J. 1995. Modelling Central-local Fiscal Relations in China. China Economic 
Review 6:105-136. 
Ministry of Finance, China. 2005. www.mof.gov.cn 
Montinola, G., Qian, Y. and Weingast, B.R. 1995. Federalism, Chinese Style: The 
Political Basis for Economic Success in China. World Politics 48:50-81. 
Mueller, D. C. 1989. Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mui, M. and Jia, I. 2002. China Reforms for the World Stage. International Tax 
Review 1. 
Musgrave, R.A. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Musgrave, R.A. 1969. Fiscal Systems. New Haven and London: Yale University 
press. 
Naughton, B. 1994. Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatisation from Below. 
American Economic Review 84:266-70. 
Northrup, H.R. and Rowan, R.L. State Seizure in Public Interest Disputes. Journal of 
Business 36:210-227. 
O’Brien, P. K. 1988. The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815. 
Economic History Review 41:1-32. 
Oates, W.E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt brace Jovanovich. 
OECD. 2005. Governance in China. Paris: OECD Publications 
Oi, J. 1992. Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism 
in China. World Politics 45:99-126. 
Oi, J. 1994. Rural China Takes Off: Incentives for Reform. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 Page 38 12/16/2005 
  38
Oi, J.C. 1995. The Role of the Local States in China’s Transitional Economy. China 
Quarterly 144:1132-1149. 
Oksenberg, M. and Tong, J. 1991. The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal 
Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System. China Quarterly 125:1-32. 
Olson, M. Jr. 1969. The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: The Division of 
Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government. American Economics 
Review 59: 479-87. 
Qian, Y. and Roland, G. 1998, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint.  American 
Economic Review 88:1143-62. 
Qian, Y. and Weingast, B.R. 1996. China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving 
Federalism, Chinese Style. Journal of Policy Reform 1:149-85. 
Qian, Y. and Weingast, B.R. 1997. Federalism As a Commitment to Market Incentives, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:83-92. 
Qian, Y., and Weingast, B.R. 1997. Federalism As a Commitment to Market 
Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:83-92. 
Ramsey, F.P. 1927. A contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 
37:47-61. 
Sappington, D.E.M. 1991. Incentives in Principal-agent Relationships. Journal of 
Economic Perspective 5:45-66. 
Sate Administration of Taxation, China. 2003. www.chinatax.gov.cn 
Shirk, S.L., 1993, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
Shleifer, A. and Treisman, D. 1999. Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic 
Reform in Russia. Harvard: MIT Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E. 1974. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of 
Economic Studies 61:219-255. 
Tsui, K. and Wang, Y. 2004. Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal 
Decentralization in China. China Quarterly 177:71-91. 
Walder, A.G. 1995. Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational 
Analysis of China’s Transitional Economy. American Journal of Sociology 101: 
 Page 39 12/16/2005 
  39
263-301. 
Walder, A.G. 1996. (ed.) China’s Transitional Economy Oxford University Press. 
Wedeman, A. 2003. From Mao to Market: Rent-Seeking, Local Protectionism, and 
Marketization in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weingast, B.R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law and Economic 
Organization 11:1-31. 
Weir, D.R. 1989. Tontines, Public Finance and Revolution in France and England, 
1688-1789. Journal of Economic History 49:95-124. 
Weitzman, M. and Xu, C. 1994. Chinese Township Village Enterprises as Vaguely 
Defined Cooperatives. Journal of Comparative Economics 18:121-45. 
Weitzman, M.L. 1980. The “Ratchet Principle” and Performance Incentives. The Bell 
Journal of Economics 11:302-8. 
White, E.N. 1995. The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 
1770-1815. Journal of Economic History 55:227-255. 
White, E.N. 2004. From Privatised to Government-administered Tax Collection: Tax 
Farming in Eighteenth-century France. Economic History Review 57:636-663. 
Wong, C.P. 1997. (ed.) Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of 
China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Wong, C.P., 1998. Fiscal Dualism in China: Gradualist Reform and the Growth of 
Off-budget Finance. in Brean, D.J. S. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New York: 
Routledge Press. 
Wong, C.P., Heady, C. and Woo, W.T. 1995. Fiscal Management and Economic 
Reform in the People’s Republic of China. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Wong, C.P.W. 1991. Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox 
of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China. China Quarterly 691-715. 
Wong, C.P.W. 1992. Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic 
Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China. Modern China 18: 197-227. 
World Bank. 1990. China: Revenue Mobilization and Tax Policy, Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
 Page 40 12/16/2005 
  40
World Bank. 1993. Budgetary Policies and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
World Bank. 1995. China: Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralised Economy, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2002. China National Development and Sub-national Finance: A Review 
of Provincial Expenditures. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Yep, R. 2004. Can ‘Tax-for-fee’ Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, 
Progress and Limitations. China Quarterly 177: 42-71. 
Zhu Z. and B. Krug. 2006. Is China a Leviathan? ERIM research series (forthcoming) 
                                                        
∗ The paper relies on fieldwork that forms part of the ‘Shift in Governance’-programme (450-02-460) of the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). The generous support by the NWO, the ERIM Research 
School and the Trustfonds of the Erasmus University, Rotterdam are gratefully acknowledged.  
1 There is a measurement problem. With the notable exception of World Bank (2002), most studies stop at 
provincial level (see e.g. Wong 1991, 1992, 1997; Wong et al 1995; World Bank 1990, 1993, 1995; Brean 1998; 
Ma 1995; Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Chung 1995; Lee 2000; Tsui and Wang 2004; OECD 2005) due to the lack of 
statistical data to the effect that a systematic analysis across provinces, prefectures, counties (districts) and 
townships is missing. 
2 The French as well as the tax farming system in Imperial China “farmed out” tax authority not only to lower 
administrative levels but also to private persons.(Lit ChinaXXX) 
3 Totally 13 taxes were levied after 1973 which were industrial and commercial tax, consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax, industrial and commercial income tax, tariff, cattle transaction tax, bazaar transaction tax, urban 
real estate tax, vehicle and vessel usage license tax, vessel tonnage tax, slaughter tax, agricultural tax, animal 
husbandry tax, and deed tax. 
4 Except the urban real estate tax and industrial and commercial income tax. 
5 Consumption tax encompasses eleven tax items and often enough serves as an educational tax discouraging the 
consumption or use of luxury products, such as cigarettes, liquor, cosmetics, jewellery, firework, gasoline, diesel 
oil, car tyre, motorcycle, and cars. 
6 In fact, total tax items are 26 not 29 because inheritance tax, security transaction tax and fuel tax are not levied 
yet. An illustration of the tax system can be found in table 1. 
7 For those rich provinces, they may keep certain portion of increment revenue based on preset shared ratio or 
formula while those poor provinces received subsidies and grants from the central government.  
8 This is known in public finance as Ramsey rule (1927): immobile factors are more vulnerable to tax as the exit 
option can be considered at high costs only. 
9 The shared tax would be retransferred to local government based on the shared ratio. 
10 Thus, for example in order to prevent fraud of VAT invoices, a computer network connecting the SAT and its 
branches down to the county (district) level, the so-called Golden Taxation Project, - was launched in 1994. By the 
end of 2002, it had installed 1.4 thousand servers, 25 thousand PC servers and 0.4 million PCs, staffed 26 thousand 
computer technicians and covered approximately 0.6 million units, i.e. about 45% of taxpayers (SAT 2003).. 
11 The ratio of total government revenue to GDP increased from 13% in 1993 to 19% in 2003. The share of the 
central government revenue to total revenue in 2003 (55%) is about two times of that in 1993 (22%), as shown in 
Figure 1.  
12 Major changes of composition of extra-budgetary revenue in 1993 and 1997 excluded the innovation fund, the 
major repair fund and government funds.  
13 The following findings form part of the larger research project on local autonomy. Both authors want to thank 
Hans Hendrischke for generously providing us with some findings of his interviews on 2004 and 2005. 
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